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Passkey Mandate: Handling Users who cannot enroll

A passkey mandate fails on the users who cannot create a passkey. How to design exceptions, sign-up, recovery and support so nobody is locked out.

Vincent Delitz
Vincent Delitz

Created: November 22, 2026

Updated: November 22, 2026

Passkey Mandate: Handling Users who cannot enroll
Key Facts
  • A passkey mandate succeeds or fails on the users who cannot create a passkey on the device they are holding right now.
  • The fallback sets the phishing ceiling of an account. Recovery is rare and can be stricter and slower than login.
  • Users who cannot enroll need an exception ladder: browser switch, device settings, cross-device QR, native app, security key and only then a documented opt-out.
  • Device readiness data from completed logins shows which device a user used. It does not show whether they own a capable one.
  • Under a mandate, sign-up must create the passkey itself, because enrollment can no longer wait for a later login.
  • NIST SP 800-63B-4 lists two recovery codes from different methods, one code plus a bound authenticator or repeated identity proofing as AAL2 recovery options.

1. Introduction#

More organizations are moving to a passkey mandate: from "passkeys are available" to "passkeys are required". Regulators push away from OTPs: Hong Kong's SFC bans OTPs for client login at internet brokers and crypto platforms from July 2027, the UAE central bank phases out SMS and email OTPs and the Philippines restricts SMS OTP for banks. Large platforms move on their own: Microsoft made new consumer accounts passwordless by default in May 2025 and prompts them for a passkey, and Meta started requiring passkey creation for users tied to ad business portfolios in August 2026.

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A passkey mandate brings two goals into conflict. A high passkey share needs firm prompts and enforcement. At the same time, nobody may be locked out, and some users do not have a device that can hold a passkey today. Both goals can hold, but mandates trade lockout risk against support load and build effort.

This article covers the part of a passkey mandate most plans leave open: what happens to the users who cannot enroll. It answers:

  • What actually changes when passkeys become mandatory?
  • Who cannot create a passkey and how do you find out?
  • Which exception path should a blocked user follow?
  • How do sign-up and recovery change under a mandate?
  • Which decisions must leadership make before engineering can build anything?

For the voluntary part of the journey, from adding passkeys to optional password removal, see our guide on how to go fully passwordless.

2. What changes when Passkeys become mandatory?#

A mandate is often discussed as one switch. In practice, four settings change together and every question about exceptions, fallback and recovery has a different answer before and after enforcement.

2.1 Mandate as an Enforcement Stage after the voluntary Phases#

Our passwordless guide describes the voluntary phases: add passkeys, grow adoption and let users switch off their password. A passkey mandate is an additional enforcement stage on top. The guide's last phase, phishing-resistant recovery, is covered in section 6 below. A mandate changes four settings at once:

SettingVoluntary phasesPasskey mandate
PasskeyOptional, prompted after loginRequired to continue after login
PasswordOn, or off by the user's choiceOnly until a passkey exists
Daily fallbackPassword plus second factorCross-device, app or security key
RecoveryPassword reset or two recovery factorsStronger recovery with identity check

Because all four move together, nothing should be enforced before these gates are met:

  • Every login surface (web, native apps, embedded web views, partner portals) works with a passkey alone
  • Password-free recovery is live and tested with real users
  • The exception path and the opt-out policy are approved and support is briefed
  • The group of users who will be blocked is sized per platform

Users who switch off their password voluntarily are the best test group: they try password-free login and recovery before you force anyone into it. Set the gates before the rollout starts.

2.2 Fallback sets the Phishing Ceiling, Recovery can be stricter#

Teams often mix up three terms that need different answers:

  • Primary method: The method users use every day. Passwords can be phished but work on any device. Passkeys resist phishing by design but need a ready device.
  • Fallback: Another way in when the primary method is not available, used daily on another computer or in an in-app browser. Attackers pick the weakest way in, so the fallback sets the phishing ceiling of the account.
  • Recovery: Getting back in after losing all methods. A new phone after the old one is lost, with no synced passkey, is the typical case. Recovery is rare, so it can be monitored, delayed and checked more strictly than a fallback.

PayPal shows why the fallback matters: it reported at Authenticate 2026 that it sees no phishing among passkey logins, yet attackers still take over accounts through SMS OTP and password fallbacks. A mandate that keeps password plus SMS OTP as a daily fallback for everyone improves user experience but not the security of the account.

"Passwordless" also does not mean phishing-resistant. An account that only uses email or SMS codes is passwordless, but still phishable. The aim of a mandate is to narrow the fallback step by step while recovery gets stronger.

3. Who cannot create a Passkey?#

Before enforcing anything, you need to know who will hit the wall and why. The reasons differ in how easy they are to fix:

  • Unsupported or in-app browser: Social media and messaging apps open links in embedded browsers that often cannot create passkeys. The user has a capable device but the wrong browser.
  • Outdated operating system or browser: Older Windows, Android or iOS versions lack passkey support or a usable credential manager.
  • No screen lock: Platform authenticators require a device PIN, pattern or biometric. Users without a screen lock cannot create a passkey until they set one.
  • Managed or shared computers: Enterprise IT can block iCloud Keychain or Google Password Manager. Meta named this as one of the main problems of its advertiser mandate. Shared devices such as family computers raise the question of whose passkey is stored there.
  • Desktop without Bluetooth: The cross-device QR flow needs Bluetooth on the desktop as a proximity check. Without it, the hybrid flow dead-ends.
  • Accessibility needs: Biometric prompts and QR codes can be hard to use with screen readers or motor impairments. Device PINs remain available as an alternative to biometrics.
  • No smartphone at all: A small group has neither a capable computer nor a phone.

3.1 Why Device Readiness Data misleads#

A device readiness audit is the right starting point, but a common mistake is to size the exception group with readiness figures from completed login sessions alone. These figures describe which device a user used. They do not show whether the user could switch to a capable one. A user blocked on a locked-down work computer may already have a passkey-ready phone in their pocket, or even a synced passkey on it. For this user, the right next step is the cross-device flow.

The opposite also happens: a user on a capable device can still fail because they cancel the prompt, dismiss a confusing OS dialog or use an in-app browser for this one visit. Readiness data should therefore be combined with enrollment attempts and failure reasons per platform before you estimate how many users will need help. Our article on passkey analytics describes which signals to collect.

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4. Passkey Mandate Exception Ladder for Users who cannot enroll#

Once a mandate blocks access until a passkey exists, every blocked user needs a next step. The pattern that works separates self-service from assisted support and puts the opt-out at the very end. The following ladder shows the order in which a blocked user should try the options.

4.1 Self-service first#

Most blocked users can fix the problem themselves if the interface tells them how:

  1. Switch browser: Detect in-app and unsupported browsers and tell the user how to open the page in Safari, Chrome or Edge. A generic "something went wrong" is the most expensive message you can show here.
  2. Fix device settings: If the platform reports that no user-verifying authenticator is available, explain how to turn on a screen lock or update the operating system.
  3. Use the phone: Offer the cross-device QR flow to create or use a passkey on a phone. Explain the path before you start it: the user needs the phone at hand and Bluetooth on the desktop. QR guidance helps but cannot remove all usability problems or compensate for missing Bluetooth.

4.2 Assisted Support second#

If self-service fails, the user contacts support. Support needs a short script with options it may offer:

  1. Continue in the native app: If the organization has an app and the user has it installed, the user completes the task in the app. Push approval of a web login through the app does not count, because it reintroduces a phishable path.
  2. Security key: A hardware security key works on computers that cannot run a platform authenticator and is the strongest option for users without a smartphone. Decide upfront whether you ship keys, reimburse them or only accept them.

4.3 Documented Opt-out as last Resort#

Some users will still be left: no capable device, no phone, no way to use a key. For them, a mandate needs an approved opt-out. Treat it as a controlled exception with:

  • A named approver and a documented reason
  • A review date, so opt-outs do not become permanent by default
  • Compensating controls such as transaction limits, step-up checks or stricter monitoring
  • A clear owner who reports the opt-out rate per cohort

Without an opt-out, the mandate either locks people out or support starts improvising exceptions nobody tracks.

4.4 Accessibility Testing with Screen Readers#

WCAG 2.2 success criterion 3.3.8 treats device-based authentication such as Face ID, Touch ID or Windows Hello as not being a cognitive function test, so passkeys can make login more accessible than passwords. Your specific journeys still need testing. Test the enrollment and login flows with VoiceOver and TalkBack, check what the screen reader announces at each OS prompt and review the platform guidance from Apple and Google. Check local accessibility requirements before the mandate.

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5. How must Sign-up change under a Mandate?#

Teams often design the mandate for existing users and forget new registrations. Sign-up is a separate journey: at the start, the account does not exist yet.

  • Keep sign-up unchanged during adoption: During the voluntary phases, new users can register as today. Passkey creation can follow right after registration or wait until the next login.
  • Create the account before the passkey: In most identity platforms, a passkey is bound to an account ID. The account must exist in the identity provider before the passkey can be attached. Sequence account creation and credential creation explicitly and decide what happens if passkey creation fails after the account exists.
  • Require the passkey within sign-up after the mandate: From the mandate on, enrollment can no longer wait for a later login. Registration must create the passkey on the current device or through the QR flow and must handle the same browser and device barriers as the exception ladder above.
  • Keep collecting recovery addresses: Email and phone number remain necessary for recovery, even when sign-up no longer uses a password.

Microsoft goes part of the way for new consumer accounts: they never set a password and are prompted to enroll a passkey after sign-in, which then becomes the default for later sign-ins. A mandate goes one step further and makes that enrollment required.

6. Recovery once the Password is gone#

While passwords exist, password reset works as today. Once passwords go, recovery becomes the only way back in for users who lost all their passkeys and it becomes the obvious target for attackers.

NIST SP 800-63B-4 gives a useful reference for AAL2 accounts. It allows recovery with two recovery codes obtained through different methods (saved codes, issued codes and recovery contacts), one recovery code plus authentication with a bound single-factor authenticator or repeated identity proofing. In all cases, the account holder must be notified of the recovery event. Note that a code sent by email and a code sent by SMS are both issued codes: together they count as one method and both remain phishable.

A practical way to apply this is to tier recovery by account risk:

Account riskRecovery
LowSaved recovery code plus an issued code by email or SMS
MediumRecovery code plus a still-bound security key
HighRepeated identity proofing for accounts proofed at onboarding, e.g. document and selfie verification, plus a time hold

Three practices make recovery harder to abuse:

  • Time hold: Delay sensitive actions for a period after recovery, so a legitimate user has time to react to the notification.
  • Do not send blocked users to recovery by default: A user without a passkey on the current device often still has one on another device. Point them to the cross-device flow first.
  • Monitor recovery volume: A sudden increase is a sign of an attack or a broken enrollment flow.

More on attacker techniques and risk tiers is in our article on passkey account recovery.

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7. Enforcing the Mandate Cohort by Cohort#

A passkey mandate should not hit all users on the same day. Enforce it per cohort, for example by platform, product line or user segment, and learn from each wave before the next one.

Meta's advertiser mandate built on a large optional base and gave users a grace period of 14 to 30 days with repeated warnings.

For each cohort, track:

  • Blocked users: Share of users who reach the mandate and cannot continue
  • Self-service resolution: Share of blocked users who finish enrollment through a browser switch, a settings change or the QR flow
  • Enrollment failures per platform: OS, browser and credential manager combinations that fail more than others
  • Support contacts and handling time: How much load each wave adds to the support team
  • Opt-out rate: How many users end at the last step of the ladder

If one of these numbers moves above the threshold you set for the cohort, pause the next cohort and fix the cause first. Plan support capacity for each wave rather than for the average.

8. Decisions Leadership must make before Engineering builds#

The technical work depends on policy choices. Product and risk owners should settle these before engineering designs the flows:

  1. Exceptions: Which support-led exceptions are allowed and who approves an opt-out?
  2. Recovery assurance: Which recovery tier applies to which accounts?
  3. Access restriction: Is the organization willing to block access to the account until a user creates a passkey, or does the mandate only apply to new devices or sensitive actions?
  4. Grace period: How long do users get between the first warning and enforcement?
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9. How Corbado can help#

Corbado helps teams plan and run a passkey mandate without locking users out:

See Passkey Enrollment in Corbado Observe →
  • Size the exception group: Corbado Observe shows enrollment attempts, failure reasons and passkey usage per OS, browser and credential manager on top of your existing identity provider. You see who will be blocked before the mandate starts.
  • Track each cohort: Observe compares enrollment, blocked users and fallback use per cohort, so you can decide with data whether the next wave is ready.
  • Add passkeys to your existing IdP: Corbado Connect adds passkey login and enrollment on top of your current identity platform, including cross-device flows and passkey management.
  • Advisory: Our team helps define the enforcement gates, the exception ladder and the recovery policy.

10. Conclusion#

A passkey mandate is a policy decision first and a technical project second. Meta called its mandatory passkey creation relatively low friction overall, so most users follow a firm prompt. The mandate succeeds or fails on the users who cannot and on whether the organization has decided in advance what happens to them.

The answers to the questions from the introduction:

  • What changes: Passkey, password, daily fallback and recovery change together. Nothing should be enforced before every surface works with a passkey alone and recovery is tested.
  • Who cannot enroll: Users with in-app or outdated browsers, no screen lock, managed computers, no Bluetooth, accessibility needs or no smartphone. Readiness data from completed logins alone does not tell you whether they could switch device.
  • Which path: Self-service first (browser, settings, QR), support second (app, security key), a documented opt-out last.
  • Sign-up and recovery: Sign-up must create the passkey once the mandate starts. Recovery can be stricter than the fallback because it is rare.
  • Leadership decisions: Exceptions and their approver, recovery assurance, access restriction and grace period.

Frequently Asked Questions#

What happens to users who cannot create a passkey under a passkey mandate?#

They move down an exception ladder. Self-service steps come first: switching from an in-app or outdated browser to Safari, Chrome or Edge, turning on a screen lock and creating the passkey on a phone through the cross-device QR flow. If self-service fails, support can offer the native app, a hardware security key or, as the last resort, a documented and time-limited opt-out with a named approver.

When is it safe to make passkeys mandatory?#

Only after every login surface works with a passkey alone, recovery without a password has been tested and the last-resort exceptions are decided. Enforce cohort by cohort with a grace period and repeated warnings. Meta used a grace period of 14 to 30 days when it started requiring passkey creation for users tied to ad business portfolios in August 2026.

Why does the fallback method matter so much in a passkey mandate?#

Attackers pick the weakest way into an account. While a phishable fallback such as password plus SMS OTP remains available for daily use, it sets the phishing ceiling of the whole account. PayPal reported at Authenticate 2026 that it sees no phishing among passkey logins but still sees account takeover through SMS OTP and password fallbacks.

How should account recovery work after passwords are removed?#

Recovery is rare, so it can be stricter and slower than login. NIST SP 800-63B-4 allows AAL2 recovery with two recovery codes obtained through different methods, one recovery code plus a bound single-factor authenticator or repeated identity proofing. Every recovery event must trigger a notification. Many teams add a time hold before the recovered account can perform sensitive actions.

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