act claim for the
acting party. The Personal Agent Protocol (Poppy) from Sierra and Meta reached version 1.0
in November 2026 and adds discovery and agent sessions across website and API.A user asks a personal agent to book a flight. The agent opens the airline's website in its own browser, searches, picks a flight and then hits the login box.
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What happens next in most of today's demos is simple. The agent asks for the user's password and promises to store it securely. The user hands it over because they want the flight booked. From then on the website sees the agent as the user, with no way to tell the difference.
This article covers why that happens, why the two common reactions do not work and how delegated agent logins work in practice. The passkey side of the topic (why a passkey cannot and should not be handed to an agent) is covered in our article on AI agents and passkeys.
The clean way for an agent to act for a user is an API with OAuth. Most companies do not expose their full customer journey that way and they will not do so quickly. Personal agents therefore ship with a browser or take over the user's computer and use the website like a person would.
Three kinds of agents now reach consumer accounts:
| Agent type | Examples | How it meets your login |
|---|---|---|
| Agent browser | ChatGPT Atlas in agent mode | Runs a browser session for the agent and reaches the login form like any other visitor |
| Computer use agent | Codex Computer Use on macOS and Windows, Claude in Chrome | Operates the user's own desktop or browser and works on pages where the user is already signed in |
| Terminal agent | Claude Code, Codex CLI | Skips the website and calls APIs or MCP servers directly. Signs in through an OAuth flow in the user's browser or uses an API key or token the user configures |
The second type matters for CIAM teams because it bypasses the login form entirely. OpenAI's documentation for Codex Computer Use says it "can interact with pages where you're already signed in" and advises users to stay present for account and credential-related steps. Anthropic recommends running Claude in Chrome in a separate browser profile without access to sensitive accounts. To the website, these sessions look like the user.
The third type is closest to the clean path. When a terminal agent connects to a remote MCP server, Claude Code and Codex CLI both start an OAuth login that opens in the user's browser and store the resulting tokens for later calls. The user signs in on the company's own login page and the agent receives a token instead of a password. The weak spot is the alternative many users choose for convenience: pasting a long-lived API key or personal access token into the agent's configuration. That is a credential handover that often has no expiry and never has an agent-specific scope.
Security vendors report that early adopters no longer visit airline or hotel websites themselves and that even small business owners without a technical background now run several agents for sourcing, accounting or social media. Customers will increasingly send agents instead of coming themselves and those agents will come more often than the user ever did.
For a CIAM team, three things follow from that:
Some companies try to detect and block agent traffic. It is an arms race and it is getting harder: the systems built to stop bots, for example during limited product drops, are easier for agents to get around because agents are smarter than the bots they replace. Even when blocking works, it turns away a customer who was ready to pay.
The default today is impersonation. It comes in two forms: the user gives the agent their password or the agent works inside a browser where the user is already signed in. Either way the agent acts as the user. That creates three problems:
The third option is delegation. A hotel makes the difference clear. Impersonation is giving your assistant a copy of your room key: the hotel thinks the assistant is you, the assistant can open every door you can and nobody knows who opened what. Delegation is asking the front desk for a guest card in your assistant's name, valid for your room only and only for tonight, with every door it opens logged.
The OAuth standard for token exchange draws the same line. RFC 8693, section 1.1 defines impersonation as an actor that receives all the rights of the subject and cannot be told apart from it. With delegation, the actor keeps its own identity separate from the user's.
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Delegation is well understood for APIs. For web browsing, which is where agents actually show up, the pattern has three steps:
In the tokens, the user stays the subject and the agent is recorded as the actor, using the
act claim from
RFC 8693, section 4.1. The
granted permissions go into the scope claim
(section 4.2):
{ "sub": "user-12345", "act": { "sub": "agent:personal-assistant-7f3a" }, "scope": "flights:search flights:book", "exp": 1795075200 }
Auth0's Session Delegation
follows this pattern for support staff acting for a user and the same mechanics apply to
agents: the resulting access and ID tokens carry an act claim, no refresh
tokens are issued and the exchange fails with interaction_required when MFA or consent
would be needed. That last point keeps the human in the loop by design.
With two identities in the session, the website can apply different rules to agent sessions, for example allowing a booking but not a change of payment details. For high-risk steps it can still bring the human back in. The OpenID standard for this is Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication (CIBA): the website asks the identity provider to send an approval request to the user's own device and continues only when the user confirms.
Three recommendations follow:
Igor Gjorgjioski
Senior Product Lead, VicRoads
We hit 80% mobile passkey activation across 5M+ users without replacing our IDP.
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Read the case studySeveral standards now address parts of the problem:
| Standard | What it adds | Status (Nov 2026) |
|---|---|---|
| OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693) | Exchanging a user token for one that names the acting party (act claim) | Published RFC, widely supported by identity providers |
| MCP authorization | OAuth 2.1 based authorization when agents call a company's tools through MCP | Part of the MCP specification (version 2026-07-28) |
| OpenID CIBA | Approval of a single action on the user's own device | Final specification since 2021 |
| Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant | Agent access across enterprise apps based on the user's SSO identity | IETF draft, mainly for workforce scenarios |
| Personal Agent Protocol (Poppy) | Discovery file at /.well-known/poppy.json, guest and signed-in agent sessions across website, APIs and the company's own agent | Announced by Sierra and Meta in October 2026, version 1.0 released on 13 November 2026 |
Poppy is the one to watch for consumer website logins. It describes how a company tells agents where customers sign in, which actions an agent may take and how an agent can start a session as a guest (to check stock or a returns policy) or as a signed-in customer through OAuth. A retailer could, for example, let an agent start a return but not change the card on file. Version 1.0 is enabled for Shopify merchants and identity providers have started to add support: Auth0 announced a beta program for personal agents in November 2026 in which APIs see both the user and the agent.
The practical consequences for CIAM teams fall into four points:
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A passkey cannot be handed to an agent. It requires a user gesture on the user's device and that is a feature: it rules out the password handover from section 1. In a delegated flow the passkey belongs in step one, where the user proves who they are before granting the agent access. It also belongs in step-ups for high-risk actions. Our article on AI agents and passkeys covers this pattern in detail, including OAuth scopes and human-in-the-loop confirmation.
Before you decide how to treat agents at your login, you need to see what your login already does when agent browsers start using it. Corbado Observe, the authentication observability layer, measures every login flow on your existing stack, including the ones that fail.
See Login Funnel in Corbado Observe →Agents already log in to websites for their users, mostly with a shared password or the user's own signed-in browser. Blocking them loses customers and ignoring them loses control. Delegation keeps both: the user authenticates once with a strong method, the agent gets a limited session in its own name and every action can be traced back to both.
The building blocks exist today in OAuth token exchange and the act claim. The Personal
Agent Protocol is turning them into a common way for companies to describe how agents may
sign in. Teams that start by measuring how their login handles agent traffic will be in a
better position to decide which of these to adopt.
Corbado is the Passkey Intelligence Platform for large-scale CIAM teams running consumer authentication. We help you see what IDP logs and generic analytics tools can't: where passkeys, passwords, OTP, social login and fallback journeys succeed, stall or fail, which devices and browsers create friction, and when an OS update silently breaks login. Two products: Corbado Observe layers process mining and observability across authentication journeys. Corbado Connect adds managed passkeys with analytics built in alongside your IDP. VicRoads runs passkeys for 5M+ users with Corbado (more than 80% passkey activation rate). Talk to a Passkey Expert →
Use delegated tokens in which the user stays the subject and the agent is named in the act claim from RFC 8693, section 4.1. With both identities in the ID and access tokens, the website can apply agent-specific rules, for example allowing a flight booking but blocking a change of payment details.
The user signs in once on the company's normal login page in their own browser and consents to the agent. The agent then exchanges its token at the company's login service for a single-use session transfer token and receives a one-time link that opens a session for user and agent. In Auth0's implementation this token expires after one minute.
Poppy is a protocol from Sierra and Meta that tells agents where customers sign in and which actions they may take, through a discovery file at /.well-known/poppy.json. Agents can start guest or signed-in sessions across website, APIs and the company's own agent. Version 1.0 was released on 13 November 2026.
Computer use agents operate the user's own desktop or browser and work on pages where the user is already signed in. The website only sees the user's existing session and cannot tell that an agent is acting. That makes it a form of impersonation with no agent-specific limits and no audit trail.
Use OpenID Connect Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication (CIBA). The website asks the identity provider to send an approval request to the user's own device and continues only after the user confirms, for example with a passkey. Auth0's Session Delegation also fails with interaction_required when MFA or consent would be needed, which keeps the human in the loop.
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