---
url: 'https://www.corbado.com/blog/passkey-mandate-exceptions'
title: 'Passkey Mandate: Handling Users who cannot enroll'
description: 'A passkey mandate fails on the users who cannot create a passkey. How to design exceptions, sign-up, recovery and support so nobody is locked out.'
lang: 'en'
author: 'Vincent Delitz'
date: '2026-11-22T11:57:53.337Z'
lastModified: '2026-11-22T13:22:14.559Z'
keywords: 'passkey mandate, mandatory passkeys, mandatory passkey enrollment, passkey exceptions, passkey opt-out, users who cannot use passkeys'
category: 'Authentication'
---

# Passkey Mandate: Handling Users who cannot enroll

## Key Facts

- A passkey mandate succeeds or fails on the **users who cannot create a passkey** on the
  device they are holding right now.
- The **fallback sets the phishing ceiling** of an account. Recovery is rare and can be
  stricter and slower than login.
- Users who cannot enroll need an **exception ladder**: browser switch, device settings,
  cross-device QR, native app, security key and only then a documented opt-out.
- Device readiness data from completed logins shows **which device a user used**. It does
  not show whether they own a capable one.
- Under a mandate, **sign-up must create the passkey itself**, because enrollment can no
  longer wait for a later login.
- NIST SP 800-63B-4 lists **two recovery codes from different methods, one code plus a
  bound authenticator or repeated identity proofing** as AAL2 recovery options.

## 1. Introduction

More organizations are moving to a passkey mandate: from "passkeys are available" to
"passkeys are required". Regulators push away from OTPs: Hong Kong's SFC
[bans OTPs for client login](https://www.corbado.com/blog/hong-kong-sfc-otp-ban-passkeys) at internet brokers
and crypto platforms from July 2027, the UAE central bank
[phases out SMS and email OTPs](https://www.corbado.com/blog/uae-banking-otp-phase-out) and the
[Philippines](https://www.corbado.com/blog/philippines-compliance) restricts SMS OTP for banks. Large platforms move
on their own: Microsoft made
[new consumer accounts passwordless by default](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/05/01/pushing-passkeys-forward-microsofts-latest-updates-for-simpler-safer-sign-ins/)
in May 2025 and prompts them for a passkey, and Meta started
[requiring passkey creation](https://www.corbado.com/blog/disable-passwords-case-studies-authenticate-2026) for
users tied to ad business portfolios in August 2026.

A passkey mandate brings two goals into conflict. A high passkey share needs firm
prompts and enforcement. At the same time, nobody may be locked out, and
some users do not have a device that can hold a passkey today. Both goals can hold, but mandates trade lockout risk against support load and build
effort.

This article covers the part of a passkey mandate most plans leave open: what happens to
the users who cannot enroll. It answers:

- What actually changes when passkeys become mandatory?
- Who cannot create a passkey and how do you find out?
- Which exception path should a blocked user follow?
- How do sign-up and recovery change under a mandate?
- Which decisions must leadership make before engineering can build anything?

For the voluntary part of the journey, from adding passkeys to optional password removal,
see our guide on [how to go fully passwordless](https://www.corbado.com/blog/how-to-go-fully-passwordless).

## 2. What changes when Passkeys become mandatory?

A mandate is often discussed as one switch. In practice, four settings change together
and every question about exceptions, fallback and recovery has a different answer before
and after enforcement.

### 2.1 Mandate as an Enforcement Stage after the voluntary Phases

Our [passwordless guide](https://www.corbado.com/blog/how-to-go-fully-passwordless) describes the voluntary
phases: add passkeys, grow adoption and let users switch off their password. A passkey
mandate is an additional enforcement stage on top. The guide's last phase,
phishing-resistant recovery, is covered in section 6 below. A mandate changes four
settings at once:

| Setting | Voluntary phases | Passkey mandate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Passkey | Optional, prompted after login | Required to continue after login |
| Password | On, or off by the user's choice | Only until a passkey exists |
| Daily fallback | Password plus second factor | Cross-device, app or security key |
| Recovery | Password reset or two recovery factors | Stronger recovery with identity check |

Because all four move together, **nothing should be enforced before these gates are met**:

- Every login surface (web, native apps, embedded web views, partner portals) works with a
  passkey alone
- Password-free recovery is live and tested with real users
- The exception path and the opt-out policy are approved and support is briefed
- The group of users who will be blocked is sized per platform

Users who switch off their password voluntarily are the best test group: they try
password-free login and recovery before you force anyone into it. Set the gates before
the rollout starts.

![Four phases of a passkey rollout: add passkeys, adoption, optional password off and mandate, with goals, switches and the gate to move on](https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/corbado-cloud-staging-website-assets/passkey_mandate_phases_274628fbaa.png)

### 2.2 Fallback sets the Phishing Ceiling, Recovery can be stricter

Teams often mix up three terms that need different answers:

- **Primary method:** The method users use every day. Passwords can be phished but work on
  any device. Passkeys resist phishing by design but need a ready device.
- **Fallback:** Another way in when the primary method is not available, used daily on
  another computer or in an in-app browser. Attackers pick the weakest way in, so **the
  fallback sets the phishing ceiling** of the account.
- **Recovery:** Getting back in after losing all methods. A new phone after the old one is
  lost, with no synced passkey, is the typical case. Recovery is rare, so it can be
  monitored, delayed and checked more strictly than a fallback.

![Primary method, fallback, recovery and passwordless defined, with what each becomes under a passkey mandate](https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/corbado-cloud-staging-website-assets/passkey_mandate_fallback_recovery_cfbf649704.png)

PayPal shows why the fallback matters: it
[reported at Authenticate 2026](https://www.corbado.com/blog/disable-passwords-case-studies-authenticate-2026)
that it sees no phishing among passkey logins, yet attackers still take over accounts
through SMS OTP and password fallbacks. A mandate that keeps password plus SMS OTP as a
daily fallback for everyone improves user experience but not the security of the account.

"Passwordless" also does not mean phishing-resistant. An account that only uses email or
SMS codes is passwordless, but still phishable. The aim of a mandate is to narrow the
fallback step by step while recovery gets stronger.

## 3. Who cannot create a Passkey?

Before enforcing anything, you need to know who will hit the wall and why. The reasons
differ in how easy they are to fix:

- **Unsupported or in-app browser:** Social media and messaging apps open links in
  embedded browsers that often cannot create passkeys. The user has a capable device but
  the wrong browser.
- **Outdated operating system or browser:** Older Windows, Android or iOS versions lack
  passkey support or a usable credential manager.
- **No screen lock:** Platform authenticators require a device PIN, pattern or biometric.
  Users without a screen lock cannot create a passkey until they set one.
- **Managed or shared computers:** Enterprise IT can block
  [iCloud Keychain](https://www.corbado.com/glossary/icloud-keychain) or
  [Google Password Manager](https://www.corbado.com/blog/how-to-use-google-password-manager). Meta named this as
  one of the main problems of its advertiser mandate. Shared devices such as family
  computers raise the question of whose passkey is stored there.
- **Desktop without Bluetooth:** The cross-device QR flow needs Bluetooth on the desktop
  as a proximity check. Without it, the
  [hybrid flow](https://www.corbado.com/blog/webauthn-passkey-qr-code) dead-ends.
- **Accessibility needs:** Biometric prompts and QR codes can be hard to use with screen
  readers or motor impairments. Device PINs remain available as an alternative to
  biometrics.
- **No smartphone at all:** A small group has neither a capable computer nor a phone.

### 3.1 Why Device Readiness Data misleads

A [device readiness audit](https://www.corbado.com/blog/mandating-mfa) is the right starting point, but a common
mistake is to size the exception group with readiness figures from completed login
sessions alone. These figures describe **which device a user used**. They do not
show whether the user could switch to a capable one. A user blocked on a locked-down work computer may
already have a passkey-ready phone in their pocket, or even a synced passkey on it. For
this user, the right next step is the cross-device flow.

The opposite also happens: a user on a capable device can still fail because they cancel
the prompt, dismiss a confusing OS dialog or use an in-app browser for this one visit.
Readiness data should therefore be combined with enrollment attempts and failure reasons
per platform before you estimate how many users will need help. Our article on
[passkey analytics](https://www.corbado.com/blog/passkey-analytics) describes which signals to collect.

## 4. Passkey Mandate Exception Ladder for Users who cannot enroll

Once a mandate blocks access until a passkey exists, every blocked user needs a next step.
The pattern that works separates self-service from assisted support and puts the opt-out
at the very end. The following ladder shows the order in which a blocked user should try
the options.

### 4.1 Self-service first

Most blocked users can fix the problem themselves if the interface tells them how:

1. **Switch browser:** Detect in-app and unsupported browsers and tell the user how to open
   the page in Safari, Chrome or Edge. A generic "something went wrong" is the most
   expensive message you can show here.
2. **Fix device settings:** If the platform reports that no user-verifying authenticator is
   available, explain how to turn on a screen lock or update the operating system.
3. **Use the phone:** Offer the [cross-device QR flow](https://www.corbado.com/blog/webauthn-passkey-qr-code) to
   create or use a passkey on a phone. Explain the path before you start it: the user needs
   the phone at hand and Bluetooth on the desktop. QR guidance helps but cannot remove all
   usability problems or compensate for missing Bluetooth.

### 4.2 Assisted Support second

If self-service fails, the user contacts support. Support needs a short script with
options it may offer:

4. **Continue in the native app:** If the organization has an app and the user has it
   installed, the user completes the task in the app. Push approval of a web login through
   the app does not count, because it reintroduces a phishable path.
5. **Security key:** A [hardware security key](https://www.corbado.com/blog/best-fido2-hardware-security-keys)
   works on computers that cannot run a platform authenticator and is the strongest option
   for users without a smartphone. Decide upfront whether you ship keys, reimburse them or
   only accept them.

### 4.3 Documented Opt-out as last Resort

Some users will still be left: no capable device, no phone, no way to use a key. For them,
a mandate needs an **approved opt-out**. Treat it as a controlled exception with:

- A named approver and a documented reason
- A review date, so opt-outs do not become permanent by default
- Compensating controls such as transaction limits, step-up checks or stricter monitoring
- A clear owner who reports the opt-out rate per cohort

Without an opt-out, the mandate either locks people out or support starts improvising
exceptions nobody tracks.

### 4.4 Accessibility Testing with Screen Readers

[WCAG 2.2 success criterion 3.3.8](https://www.w3.org/WAI/WCAG22/Understanding/accessible-authentication-minimum.html)
treats device-based authentication such as Face ID, Touch ID or Windows Hello as not
being a cognitive function test, so passkeys can make login more accessible than
passwords. Your specific journeys still need testing. Test the enrollment and login
flows with VoiceOver and TalkBack, check what the screen reader announces at each OS
prompt and review the platform guidance from Apple and Google. Check local accessibility
requirements before the mandate.

## 5. How must Sign-up change under a Mandate?

Teams often design the mandate for existing users and forget new registrations. Sign-up is
a separate journey: at the start, the account does not exist yet.

- **Keep sign-up unchanged during adoption:** During the voluntary phases, new users can
  register as today. Passkey creation can follow right after registration or wait until the next login.
- **Create the account before the passkey:** In most identity platforms, a passkey is bound
  to an account ID. The account must exist in the identity provider before the passkey can
  be attached. Sequence account creation and credential creation explicitly and decide
  what happens if passkey creation fails after the account exists.
- **Require the passkey within sign-up after the mandate:** From the mandate on,
  enrollment can no longer wait for a later login. Registration must create the passkey on
  the current device or through the QR flow and must handle the same browser and device
  barriers as the exception ladder above.
- **Keep collecting recovery addresses:** Email and phone number remain necessary for
  recovery, even when sign-up no longer uses a password.

Microsoft goes part of the way for new consumer accounts: they
[never set a password](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/05/01/pushing-passkeys-forward-microsofts-latest-updates-for-simpler-safer-sign-ins/)
and are prompted to enroll a passkey after sign-in, which then becomes the default for
later sign-ins. A mandate goes one step further and makes that enrollment required.

## 6. Recovery once the Password is gone

While passwords exist, password reset works as today. Once passwords go, recovery becomes
the only way back in for users who lost all their passkeys and it becomes the obvious
target for attackers.

[NIST SP 800-63B-4](https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html) gives a useful
reference for AAL2 accounts. It allows recovery with two recovery codes obtained through
different methods (saved codes, issued codes and recovery contacts), one recovery code plus
authentication with a bound single-factor authenticator or repeated identity proofing. In
all cases, the account holder must be notified of the recovery event. Note that a code
sent by email and a code sent by SMS are both issued codes: together they count as one
method and both remain phishable.

A practical way to apply this is to tier recovery by account risk:

| Account risk | Recovery |
| --- | --- |
| Low | Saved recovery code plus an issued code by email or SMS |
| Medium | Recovery code plus a still-bound security key |
| High | Repeated identity proofing for accounts proofed at onboarding, e.g. document and selfie verification, plus a time hold |

Three practices make recovery harder to abuse:

- **Time hold:** Delay sensitive actions for a period after recovery, so a legitimate user
  has time to react to the notification.
- **Do not send blocked users to recovery by default:** A user without a passkey on the
  current device often still has one on another device. Point them to the cross-device
  flow first.
- **Monitor recovery volume:** A sudden increase is a sign of an attack or a broken
  enrollment flow.

![Recovery gets stricter per phase, from password reset to two codes to an identity check, with notify, time hold, monitoring and revocation on every step](https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/corbado-cloud-staging-website-assets/passkey_mandate_recovery_per_phase_2aeb9929d3.png)

More on attacker techniques and risk tiers is in our article on
[passkey account recovery](https://www.corbado.com/blog/passkey-account-recovery-authenticate-2026).

## 7. Enforcing the Mandate Cohort by Cohort

A passkey mandate should not hit all users on the same day. Enforce it per cohort, for example by
platform, product line or user segment, and learn from each wave before the next one.

Meta's [advertiser mandate](https://www.corbado.com/blog/disable-passwords-case-studies-authenticate-2026) built
on a large optional base and gave users a grace period of 14 to 30 days with repeated
warnings.

For each cohort, track:

- **Blocked users:** Share of users who reach the mandate and cannot continue
- **Self-service resolution:** Share of blocked users who finish enrollment through a
  browser switch, a settings change or the QR flow
- **Enrollment failures per platform:** OS, browser and credential manager combinations
  that fail more than others
- **Support contacts and handling time:** How much load each wave adds to the support
  team
- **Opt-out rate:** How many users end at the last step of the ladder

If one of these numbers moves above the threshold you set for the cohort, pause the next
cohort and fix the cause first. Plan support capacity for each wave rather than for the
average.

## 8. Decisions Leadership must make before Engineering builds

The technical work depends on policy choices. Product and risk owners should settle these
before engineering designs the flows:

1. **Exceptions:** Which support-led exceptions are allowed and who approves an opt-out?
2. **Recovery assurance:** Which recovery tier applies to which accounts?
3. **Access restriction:** Is the organization willing to block access to the account
   until a user creates a passkey, or does the mandate only apply to new devices or
   sensitive actions?
4. **Grace period:** How long do users get between the first warning and enforcement?

## 9. How Corbado can help

Corbado helps teams plan and run a passkey mandate without locking users out:

[Video: Enrollment](https://www.corbado.com/videos/features/enrollment.mp4) ([See Passkey Enrollment in Corbado Observe](https://www.corbado.com/observe/passkey-enrollment))

- **Size the exception group:** [Corbado Observe](https://www.corbado.com/observe) shows enrollment attempts,
  failure reasons and passkey usage per OS, browser and credential manager on top of your
  existing identity provider. You see who will be blocked before the mandate starts.
- **Track each cohort:** Observe compares enrollment, blocked users and fallback use per
  cohort, so you can decide with data whether the next wave is ready.
- **Add passkeys to your existing IdP:** [Corbado Connect](https://www.corbado.com/connect) adds passkey login and enrollment
  on top of your current identity platform, including cross-device flows and passkey
  management.
- **Advisory:** Our team helps define the enforcement gates, the exception ladder and the
  recovery policy.

## 10. Conclusion

A passkey mandate is a policy decision first and a technical project second. Meta called
its mandatory passkey creation relatively low friction overall, so most users follow a
firm prompt. The mandate succeeds or fails on the users who cannot and on whether the
organization has decided in advance what happens to them.

The answers to the questions from the introduction:

- **What changes:** Passkey, password, daily fallback and recovery change together.
  Nothing should be enforced before every surface works with a passkey alone and recovery
  is tested.
- **Who cannot enroll:** Users with in-app or outdated browsers, no screen lock, managed
  computers, no Bluetooth, accessibility needs or no smartphone. Readiness data from
  completed logins alone does not tell you whether they could switch device.
- **Which path:** Self-service first (browser, settings, QR), support second (app,
  security key), a documented opt-out last.
- **Sign-up and recovery:** Sign-up must create the passkey once the mandate starts.
  Recovery can be stricter than the fallback because it is rare.
- **Leadership decisions:** Exceptions and their approver, recovery assurance, access
  restriction and grace period.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What happens to users who cannot create a passkey under a passkey mandate?

They move down an exception ladder. Self-service steps come first: switching from an
in-app or outdated browser to Safari, Chrome or Edge, turning on a screen lock and creating
the passkey on a phone through the cross-device QR flow. If self-service fails, support can
offer the native app, a hardware security key or, as the last resort, a documented and
time-limited opt-out with a named approver.

### When is it safe to make passkeys mandatory?

Only after every login surface works with a passkey alone, recovery without a password has
been tested and the last-resort exceptions are decided. Enforce cohort by cohort with a
grace period and repeated warnings. Meta used a grace period of 14 to 30 days when it
started requiring passkey creation for users tied to ad business portfolios in August 2026.

### Why does the fallback method matter so much in a passkey mandate?

Attackers pick the weakest way into an account. While a phishable fallback such as
password plus SMS OTP remains available for daily use, it sets the phishing ceiling of the
whole account. PayPal reported at Authenticate 2026 that it sees no phishing among passkey
logins but still sees account takeover through SMS OTP and password fallbacks.

### How should account recovery work after passwords are removed?

Recovery is rare, so it can be stricter and slower than login. NIST SP 800-63B-4 allows
AAL2 recovery with two recovery codes obtained through different methods, one recovery
code plus a bound single-factor authenticator or repeated identity proofing. Every
recovery event must trigger a notification. Many teams add a time hold before the
recovered account can perform sensitive actions.
